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TENNESSEE’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT HISTORY AND 
TODAY’S MERITED REPRIEVE FOR ITS DEATH PENALTY 
 
Randall T. Noe 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 This paper provides an overview of Tennessee’s capital 
punishment history. It ends with the existence of the state’s death 
penalty in a condition of reprieve due to its value for constitutional 
justice when properly put to use against the worst-of-the-worst and as 
a tool for plea bargainers. History shows that the state’s death penalty 
resided at times of ebb on a “death row” of its own upon the pages of 
the Tennessee Code Annotated. Despite a lengthy evolution process 
spurred on by Tennessee’s legislatures, governors, and courts over 
time, it is possible that the penalty is on “death row” because it is 
controversial, dark, and ugly. The death penalty may never again 
flow and may reach the day of ultimate ebb when its death warrant is 
signed. However, the death penalty has weathered many efforts 
toward reform, will likely never be considered “innocent,” and may 
possibly be redeemed to provide for better future application. 
Although the death penalty has never quite lived up to its potential as 
a deterrent, today it remains a vital part of constitutional justice and 
an effective tool that merits reprieve from its own “death row.” 
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II. BRIEF HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS 
 
Although the precise origins of capital punishment remain 
unclear within the dark recesses of pre-history, “capital punishment 
has been used to penalize various forms of conduct”1 since the dawn 
of civilization. “Simply put, capital punishment penalizes those 
convicted of certain crimes by killing them.”2 
“The United States inherited the bulk of its criminal law, 
including the tradition of capital punishment, primarily from England 
but also from other European countries.”3 As the states were forming, 
the newly created state sometimes adopted the law of the state from 
which it parted. Tennessee gained statehood in 1796, and its body of 
law derived from North Carolina of which it was originally a part.4 A 
look at the history of the death penalty in Tennessee indicates the 
intent of the state to utilize the death penalty as a means of 
punishment and as a deterrent to specific criminal acts.5 “Until 1829, 
the only penalty available for conviction of murder was death.”6 ”An 
act passed in 1829 divided murder into first and second degree [and] 
provided a mandatory death sentence for those convicted of first 
degree murder.7 The death penalty was not allowed for second degree 
murder, and a sentencing range of ten to twenty-one years was set 
instead.8 Tennessee legislators enacted an important change in the 
state’s homicide law in 1838 and the state became the first in the 
nation to give juries the discretion to sentence defendants to death or 
life for first degree murder.9 If the trial jury found mitigating 
circumstances in the case, and stated so in its verdict, it became the 
                                                 
1 RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with 
Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. 
REV. 613, 614 (1983). 
4 Margaret Vandiver & Michael Coconis, “Sentenced to the Punishment of 
Death”: Pre-Furman Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 
31 U. MEM. L. REV. 861, 867 (2001). 
5 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Note, The Death Penalty in Tennessee—Recent 
Developments, 8 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (1977-1978). 
6 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 870. 
7 Id. at 870-71. 
8 Id. at 871. 
9 Id. 
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statutory duty of the court to sentence the defendant to life.10 This 
change lasted just twenty years. “By 1858, the punishment for first 
degree murder was again mandatory death.”11 
“Like other slave states, Tennessee had separate statutes for 
crimes committed by whites and those committed by slaves, and, 
often by free blacks.”12 The separate laws for black and whites show 
how the state’s criminal justice system reflected the political and 
economic systems of the time.13 In post-Civil War 1865, the Tennessee 
legislature rewrote many of the old laws and omitted “reference[s] to 
race . . . .”14 
Punishment by death is not ultimately effective as a penalty 
unless carried out or executed. The public nature of applying the 
penalty and methods of death have changed over time. “All 
executions in America were public until the 1830’s.”15 A decade 
earlier, concerns began to be expressed about the propriety of such 
public spectacles.16 “The crowds that gathered to witness public 
executions were large and often unruly, disrespectful, drunken and 
dangerous [attendees of] festivals of disorder [that] subverted morals, 
increased crimes, excited sympathy with the criminal, and wasted 
time.”17 The methods varied by state, but Tennessee chose public 
hanging as its first method of execution.18 In response to an 1879 
hanging in Morristown, Tennessee a local newspaper writer wrote: 
 
[W]e would be glad indeed if we knew this was the last 
public execution that would ever occur in Tennessee. 
The whole scene here was demoralizing and in no 
respect did it in our opinion bring any good result. We 
favor hanging for deliberate murder, but we hope the 
law making power will speedily pass a law to require 
it done privately.19 
 
                                                 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 872. 
12 Id. at 867. 
13 Id. at 918. 
14 Id. at 873-74. 
15 Id. at 875. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 877. 
19 Hamblen’s Only Hanging Took Place Sept. 26, 1879, DAILY GAZETTE & MAIL, 
Nov. 13, 1955, at 14 (reprint from Oct. 1, 1879, on file with author). 
TENNESSEE’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT                      129 
 
 Pennsylvania, the first northeastern state to abolish public 
executions, did so in 1834.20 “[T]he South and southern border states 
maintain[ed] the old tradition of public executions longer than the 
rest of the country.”21 As early as 1849, a resolution was introduced to 
require the Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee to look into 
moving executions inside of prison walls, but it was rejected by that 
committee.22 “[In] 1883, [Tennessee] executions were moved from 
public spaces to the relative privacy of prison yards, [and] those who 
could witness the execution were specified.”23 The 1883 legislation 
that caused this change also contained an unfunded mandate that 
required each county to construct a private area for executions.24 After 
a proposal by Governor Patterson in 1909, the Tennessee legislature 
moved executions from the county of conviction to the state prison.25 
 “Many states changed their methods of execution from 
hanging to electrocution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in an attempt to provide a quicker and more reliable method 
of imposing death.”26 In 1911, Governor Hooper expressed to the 
legislature his desire to see Tennessee’s method of execution changed 
from hanging to electrocution as a progression of decency and 
humanity.27 In 1913, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a bill 
changing the method of execution to the electric chair, and 
appropriated $5,000 for the cost of the death chamber, apparatus, 
machinery, and appliances necessary to conduct electrocutions.28 In 
1916, the first electrocution in Tennessee took place.29 Electrocution 
continued as the sole method of execution through 1960 when 
Tennessee entered a forty-year-long, self-imposed, unofficial 
moratorium.30 
In 1999, Tennessee changed its method of execution from 
electrocution to lethal injection, but maintained electrocution as a 
                                                 
20 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 875. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 876. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 876-77. 
26 Id. at 877. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 877-78. 
29 Id. at 878, 894. 
30 Id. 
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choice for those sentenced before the end of 1998.31 In 2000, Tennessee 
carried out its first execution by lethal injection.32 Since 2000, 
Tennessee executed four death row inmates by lethal injection and 
one who volunteered for electrocution.33 
In 2011, Tennessee’s supply of sodium thiopental was seized 
by the Drug Enforcement Agency because of improper import 
procedures of the foreign-made drug.34 Sodium thiopental is used to 
induce general anesthesia as part of the state’s multi-drug lethal 
injection protocol.35 
In 2012, death row inmates in Tennessee and two other states 
sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and others “for 
improperly allowing shipments of a misbranded and new drug 
[sodium thiopental] to enter the United States for use in state lethal 
injection protocols.”36 The district judge in the case agreed with the 
inmates’ contention.37  In addition, the judge found the FDA had 
acted contrary to law by not refusing such imports.38 The judge made 
note that the FDA’s mission is to ensure that all drugs are safe and 
effective, regardless of why the drug is being administered, and that 
the law does not create an exception for drugs purchased by a state to 
use in its lethal injection protocol.39 Moreover, the judge felt the FDA 
“failed to provide a reasoned explanation for departing from [its] own 
regulations . . . to ensure illegal, foreign shipments of [sodium] 
thiopental were not admitted in to [sic] the United States.”40 Finally, 
the judge found the FDA’s “seemingly callous indifference to the 
health consequences of those imminently facing the executioner’s 
needle . . . utterly disappointing.”41 Two years after Tennessee’s 
                                                 
31 Deborah Fins, Death Row U.S.A., 57 (Fall 2012), available at 
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Fall_2012.pdf.  
32 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database at Robert Coe, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/robert-coe, (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); see 
State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1983). 
33 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
34 Bridgit Bowden, Arkansas, Tennessee have Lethal Injection Drug Taken by the 
DEA, WPLN NEWS, July 25, 2011, http://wpln.org/?p=29072. 
35 Beaty v. Food & Drug Admin., 853 F. Supp.2d 30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
36 Id. at 32. 
37 Id. at 37. 
38 Id.  
39 Beaty, 853 F. Supp.2d at 43 n.9. 
40 Id. at 43. 
41 Id. 
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supply of sodium thiopental was seized, the state experienced a lack 
of pancuronium bromide, a strong muscle relaxant also used in the 
multi-drug lethal injection protocol.42 Before revising the state’s choice 
of drugs, the Tennessee Department of Corrections is “monitoring 




Death penalty abolition efforts are a significant element of the 
history of Tennessee’s death penalty. In 1807, Governor Sevier stated 
“[h]umanity and policy call aloud for a revisal of . . . our laws . . . to 
abolish the inhuman and prompt mode of punishing with death.”44 
Similarly, in 1837, Governor Cannon proposed that the legislature 
should “entirely [abolish] punishment by death in our state, and . . . 
[substitute] in its stead confinement . . . during life.”45  In 1845, 
Governor Brown also stated his position in favor of the abolition of 
capital punishment to the legislature.46 He expressed that a just and 
rational society should regard the ancient barbarities of the death 
penalty with the deepest level of abhorrence and that relaxation of 
such laws would not lead to increases in crime.47 Despite the 
sentiments of these state executives, no immediate legislation was 
advanced. 
“In 1915, Tennessee did something no other southern state has 
done before or since: it abolished the death penalty for murder by 
legislative vote.”48 The bill excluded murder committed by a prisoner 
serving a life term, and was vetoed by Governor Rye.49 A motion to 
sustain the Governor’s veto passed the House despite its previous 
vote in favor of the bill; however, the Governor had delayed his veto 
past the five-day period provided by the Tennessee Constitution, and 
the bill became law.50 Tennessee’s experiment with partial abolition of 
the death penalty was short-lived.51 A week into his term in 1919, 
                                                 
42 Associated Press, Tennessee Searches for Lethal Injection Drugs, CITIZEN 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2013 at A3 (on file with author). 
43 Id. 
44 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 888. 
45 Id. at 889. 
46 Id. at 890. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 878.  
49 Id. at 880-81. 
50 Id. at 881. 
51 Id. at 881-83. 
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Governor Roberts sent word to the legislature about his perceptions 
for the potential of lawless vigilantism and lynch mob vengeance 
taking the place of the state sanctioned death penalty for murderers.52 
Governor Roberts stated that “[t]he assassin now knows that he will 
not forfeit his life by commission of the most atrocious crime upon his 
innocent victim.”53 He urged passage of a bill already introduced to 
reinstate the death penalty for first degree murder and the legislature 
responded quickly with majority votes from both bodies to pass the 
bill.54 
After an approximate forty-year lull in death penalty abolition 
activity, in 1959, Governor Clement requested in an address to the 
legislature that it give abolition of capital punishment serious 
consideration.55 After a failed legislative attempt to abolish the death 
penalty in 1961, a 1965 abolition bill with Governor Clement’s 
endorsement overwhelmingly passed the Senate only to be defeated 
by a single vote in the House.56  
In 1972, as a result of the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
decision in Furman v. Georgia57 finding the imposition of the death 
penalty as practiced nationwide violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, the punishment went 
on hiatus across the board.58 In 1973, the Tennessee Legislature 
enacted new first degree murder and death penalty statutes in an 
attempt to remedy the former laws which Furman had rendered 
unconstitutional.59 The new Tennessee death penalty statute60 added 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances patterned after the Model 
Penal Code.61 “After Furman, states sought to resuscitate their capital 
statutes by revising them to address the concerns raised in Furman; 
                                                 
52 Id. at 881-82. 
53 Id. at 882. 
54 Id. at 882-83. 
55 Id. at 892-93. 
56 Id. at 893-94; S.B. 344/H.B. 293 84th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 1965). 
57 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
58 Am. Bar Ass’n, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty 
Systems: The Tennessee Death Penalty Assessment Report; An Analysis of 





61 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 9-10; Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)-(4) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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many of the states turned to [Model Penal Code] § 210.6 as a template 
for their revised statutes, hoping in part that the prestige of the 
Institute would help to validate these new efforts.”62 The American 
Law Institute’s current position statement is, “the Institute withdraws 
Section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code in light of the current 
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a 
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment.”63 
In 1974, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the 1973 statutes 
unconstitutional and the legislature responded with amendments.64 In 
1977, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared the 1974 death penalty 
statute unconstitutional and the legislature again responded with 
amendments.65 The Tennessee murder and death penalty statutes 
faced no further declarations of unconstitutionality, and, with other 
changes discussed below, remain current.66 
In 2007, the Tennessee Legislature created the Tennessee 
Committee to Study the Administration of the Death Penalty.67 Its 
work continued for fourteen months, and it yielded several proposals 
to the legislature.68 The committee recommended “the creation of an 
independent commission to oversee capital defense services in 
Tennessee to ensure that attorneys representing those charged with 
capital murder are competent, trained, monitored, and compensated 
adequately.”69 The bill to enact this measure died in committee.70 
Another recommendation would 
                                                 
62 The Am. Law Inst., Report of the Council to the Membership of The American 
Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty, Annex B, 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf; see also Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
63 The Am. Law Inst., Publications Catalog; Model Penal Code, available at 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm? fuseaction= publications.ppage&nodeid=92, 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2013), (choosing to not endorse abolition of capital 
punishment per se). 
64 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 11; State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. 
1974). 
65 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 12; Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 
1977). 
66 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-202, 204 (2012). 
67 Am. Civil Liberties Union, The Tennessee Death Penalty Study Committee 
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[r]equire . . . the district attorney general to make 
available to the defendant for inspection and copying 
all relevant documents, tangible objects and 
statements, together with complete files of all 
investigative agencies, [and] [r]equire…the district 
attorney general to give notice to the defendant of any 
expert witnesses that the state reasonably expects to 
call as a witness at trial, [and] specifies that the district 
attorney general is not required to disclose written 
materials drafted by the prosecuting attorneys or their 
legal staff for their own use at trial.71 
 
The bill to enact this measure also died in committee.72 
 A third recommendation would “require . . . all statements 
made by a person during a custodial interrogation relating to a 
homicide . . . be electronically recorded and preserved.”73 The bill to 
enact this measure received much more attention, but was also sent to 
die in committee.74 The only recommendation of the committee 
enacted by the legislature “require[d] the administrative office of the 
court to propose a realistic time within which post-conviction relief 
petitions in capital cases are finally disposed of if it is determined the 
one-year statutory time limit is not realistic.”75 The new law became 
sub-parts (e)(1)-(3) of Tennessee’s Final Disposition of [Post-
Conviction] Petitions statute and went into effect July 8, 2009.76  Two 
other states with similar study committees “found their death penalty 
                                                                                                                   
70 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB167
9 &ga=106. 
71 Daniel Potter, Death Penalty Study Committee Issues Recommendations, 
WLPN NEWS, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://wpln.org/?p=4849. 
72 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB140
2 &ga=106. 
73 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB026
1 &ga=106(follow “Summary for SB 0261/HB 0596” hyperlink). 
74 Id. 
75 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives, 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=SB0260
&ga=106 (follow Summary for SB 0260/HB 0597” hyperlink).  
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-111(e)(1)-(3) (2012). 
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systems so broken and rife with error that repeal of the death penalty 
was recommended.”77 A recommendation to abolish the death 
penalty was noticeably absent from the Tennessee committee’s 
efforts.78 
 Regardless of the committee’s lack of an abolition 
recommendation, legislation was proposed in 2010 that would 
“remove . . . the death penalty as a possible punishment for first 
degree murder.”79 This bill died in committee.80 Abolition was 
revisited in 2011 with proposed legislation that would “remove…the 
jury’s ability to sentence a defendant convicted of first degree murder 
to death.”81 This bill also met its demise in committee.82 
 In reviewing these ancient or recent efforts, the possibility of 
abolition of Tennessee’s death penalty has remained a constant topic 
of concern. The drumbeat heartily stirring abolition efforts to a 
fevered frenzy may again resound in Tennessee, but for now THE 
status quo is maintained.    
 
IV. OTHER TWEAKS IN DEATH PENALTY-RELATED LAW 
  
 Other tweaks in death penalty-related law from Tennessee’s 
capital punishment history are important to note. In 1841, then 
Governor James K. Polk suggested to the legislature “that a law was 
needed to enable him to commute death sentences to life as well as to 
grant pardons.”83 In 1842, the legislature responded to his request 
with legislation allowing the governor to reduce a death sentence to 
life when he thought a full pardon was not warranted.84 A law 
enacted in 1858 granted the Tennessee Supreme Court the power to 
recommend the commutation of death sentences to the governor 
                                                 
77 Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 67. 
78 Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Tennessee; History of the Death Penalty; Milestones in 
Abolition Efforts, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/tennessee-1#resources. 








83 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 879. 
84 Id. 
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when in its opinion extenuating circumstances were found in 
particular cases.85 
 Some amendments to Tennessee’s statutory scheme merit 
attention: 
 
In 1988, the Tennessee Legislature amended the first 
degree murder statute by…classif[ying] as first degree 
murder the killing of a child less than thirteen years 
old if the child’s death result[ed] from one…or more 
incidents of a protracted pattern or multiple incidents 
of child abuse committed by the defendant against such 
child or if such death result[ed] from the cumulative 
effects of such pattern or incidents.86 
 
This amendment was referred to as the Scotty Trexler law.87 Scotty 
was a twenty-one month-old child murdered in Hawkins County in 
1987 by protracted and severe child abuse inflicted upon him by his 
mother’s live-in boyfriend who babysat him.88 Although initially 
charged with first degree murder, Scotty’s abuser’s charges had to be 
reduced because the statute required premeditation which could not 
be proved.89 The presiding jurist, Judge James Beckner, impacted by 
Scotty’s plight and the unavailability of harsher justice, stepped 
outside of the usual neutral cloak of the robe and advocated for the 
law’s change with testimony before the committee that drafted the 
1988 amendment.90 Scotty’s murderer is due to be released in March 
of 2015.91 In 1995, an amendment “deleted all reference to the 
requisite age of a child abuse victim in order for the defendant to be 
convicted of first degree murder.”92 
 Among other notable points, the Tennessee Legislature, in 
1989, allowed a viable fetus to be considered a murder victim.93 In 
1990, the Legislature enacted “a new statute prohibiting defendants 
                                                 
85 Id. 
86 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 15-16, (emphasis in original)(quoting 1988 
Tenn. Pub. Acts 802, §1). 






92 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 16. 
93 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a) (1989). 
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with mental retardation from being subject to the death penalty.”94 A 
1993 amendment added life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole as a sentencing option for first degree murder.95 In 2002, after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on homeland targets, “the . . . Legislature 
added ‘act[s] of terrorism’ to the list of offenses constituting first 
degree murder.”96 In 2011, the Legislature amended the provision 
related to a fetus as a victim to “include a human embryo or fetus at 
any stage of gestation in utero.”97  
 
V. RACE AS AN ISSUE 
  
 Equal justice under law is such a lofty goal that the phrase is 
engraved on the west pediment of the United States Supreme Court 
Building in Washington, D.C.98 The United States Constitution 
provides “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”99 “[E]qual protection 
applies to the federal government through judicial interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.”100 Equal, as an 
adjective, does not hold its ground in an imperfect world. In an ideal 
state, equal numbers would be demonstrated in the racial 
demographics of death row inmates. However, a look at statistics 
readily shows racial disparity in demographic comparisons. 
Nationwide, as of fall 2012, the death row population was 43.17% 
white, 41.93% black, and 14.91% other.101 Overall estimated nationwide 
prison population at the end of 2011 was 35.66 % white, 40.16% black, 
and 24.17% other.102 Overall nationwide citizen population in 2010 
                                                 
94 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 17; See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 
(1990). 
95 Id. at 16. 
96 Id. at 17 (quoting 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts 849, §2(a)). 
97 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 408, § 2. 
98 Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, The West 
Pediment Information Sheet, (Updated: Aug. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/westpediment.pdf. 
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
100 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 718 (3d ed. 2009). 
101 Fins, supra note 31, at 1.  
102 E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, 7 (Dec. 2012), available 
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
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was 72.4% white, 12.6% black, and 15% other.103 Tennessee’s death 
row population as of fall 2012 was 52% white, 43% black, and 5% 
other.104 Tennessee’s overall prison population as of mid-2012 was 
52.08% white, 45.49% black, and 2.4% other.105 Tennessee’s overall 
citizen population in 2010 was 77.56% white, 16.66% black, and 5.78% 
other.106 Even more disparate is the number of executions in 
Tennessee for the period of July 1916, through December 2, 2009, 
which show forty-five white individuals executed, or 34.35%, while 
eighty-six black individuals were executed, or 65.65%.107 
 While statistical disparity is evinced above based on racial 
classification, disparity does not mean inequity based on general 
murder suspect demographics. Statistics from 2001 through 2011 for 
national murder offenders based on crime occurrence data show 
racial demographics of 32.5% white, 37% black, 1.7% other, and 28.9% 
unknown.108 Tennessee’s encompassing murder arrest statistics from 
2002 through 2011 show racial demographics of 39.1% white, 59.7% 
black, and 1.2% other.109 Regarding statistics, some would say where 
there is smoke, there are mirrors. Others would say, based on the 
statistics regarding persons who actually commit murders in the 
United States and Tennessee, that where there is smoke, there is fire; 
and where there is fire, it should be fought. A defender of the death 
penalty wrote: 
 
[S]tatistics of overrepresentation fail to prove racial 
bias. The relevant population for comparison is not the 
general population, but rather the population of 
murderers. If the death penalty is administered 
                                                 
103 Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, Overview of 
Race and Hispanic Origin, 4 (March, 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.  
104 Fins, supra note 31, at 33. 
105 Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2012 Statistical Abstract, 24 (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://www.tn.gov/correction/pdf/StatisticalAbstract2012.pdf. 
106 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Interactive Population Search-Tennessee, 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/ popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=47. 
107 Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Tennessee Executions, available at 
http://www.tn.gov/correction/media/tnexecutions.html. 
108 See infra Table 1, Race of United States Murder Offenders Based on Crime 
Report Data, 2001-2011, (unknown category due to race being unknown at 
the time of the crime). 
109 See infra Table 2, Race of Tennessee Murder Arrestees Based on Arrest 
Data, 2002-2011. 
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without regard to race, the percentage of African 
American death row inmates found at the end of the 
process should not exceed the percentage of African 
American defendants charged with murder at the 
beginning. The available statistics indicate that is 
precisely what happens.110 
 
 In 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote of 
five-to-four, decided a case on point regarding the “question [of] 
whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial 
considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations proves 
that [a defendant’s] capital sentence is unconstitutional under the 
Eight or Fourteenth Amendment.”111 The Court stated a narrow and 
necessary burden of proof: 
 
[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection 
violation has the burden of proving “the existence of 
purposeful discrimination.” A corollary to this 
principle is that a criminal defendant must prove that 
the purposeful discrimination “had a discriminatory 
effect” on him. Thus, to prevail under the Equal 
Protection Clause, [the defendant] must prove that the 
decisionmakers [sic] in his case acted with 
discriminatory purpose.112 
 
The Court was asked to rely on historical evidence, and Justice Lewis 
Powell noted that “[a]lthough the history of racial discrimination in 
this country is undeniable, we cannot accept official actions taken 
long ago as evidence of current intent.”113  The Court found that a 
statistical study was clearly insufficient to support an inference that 
any of the decision-makers in the case acted with discriminatory 
purpose, and that the State as a whole did not act with a 
discriminatory purpose in selecting or reaffirming “a particular 
course of action at least in part ‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of’, its 
                                                 
110 Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH 
PENALTY 183, 201 (Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004). 
111 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1987). 
112 Id. at 292 (emphasis in original) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 
550 (1967); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). 
113 Id. at 298 n.20. 
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adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”114  For the defendant’s 
claim to prevail, he “would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature 
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an 
anticipated racially discriminatory effect,” and there was no evidence 
that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment statute to 
“further a racially discriminatory purpose.”115 The Court concluded 
this part of the case by holding the defendant failed to demonstrate 
the State maintained capital punishment because of its statistically 
suggested disproportionate impact, and, as there were legitimate 
reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and maintain capital 
punishment, it would not infer a discriminatory purpose on the part 
of the State of Georgia; the Court thus rejected the equal protection 
claims.116 The Court also held, “[t]he Constitution does not require 
that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with 
a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice 
system that includes capital punishment.”117 
 Along similar lines, a gender disparity claim by a male 
defendant would likely be seen as frivolous, yet grossly 
disproportionate statistics are available. The gender percentages for 
those on death row in the United States as of October 1, 2012, were 
98% male and 2% female.118 Those numbers for Tennessee were 
98.88% male and 1.12% female.119 The estimated gender percentages 
for those incarcerated for all crimes in the United States as of 
December 31, 2011, were 93.26% male and 6.74% female.120 The 
gender percentages for those suspected of murder from 2001-2011 
were 65.1% male, 7.2% female, and 27.7% unknown.121 The gender 
percentages for those arrested for murder in Tennessee from 2002 
through 2011 were 88.9% male and 11.1% female.122 The overall 
citizen population gender demographics as of 2010 for the United 
                                                 
114 Id. at 297-98. 
115 Id. at 298 (emphasis in original). 
116 Id. at 298-99. 
117 Id. at 319. 
118 Fins, supra note 31, at 1. 
119 Id. at 57. 
120 Carson & Sabol, supra note 102, at 7. 
121 See infra Table 3, Sex of United States Murder Offenders Based on Crime 
Report Data, 2001-2011, (unknown category due to gender being unknown at 
the time of the crime). 
122 See infra Table 4, Sex of Tennessee Murder Arrestees Based on Arrest Data, 
2002-2011. 
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States were 49.2% male and 50.8% female.123 The overall citizen 
population gender demographics as of 2010 for Tennessee were 
48.75% male and 51.25% female.124 
No one would consider doing away with the death penalty 
because males are disproportionately represented on death row. This 
is because males disproportionately commit more murders in general 
as the statistics above show. Likewise, abolition, mitigation, or 
leniency should not be based on race if its members are 
disproportionately responsible for originating the crimes for which 
they are arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. Similarly, no one 
fathoms trying to narrow statutory language, sentencing guidelines, 
and aggravating factors to be more inclusive of females. Such 
language is gender neutral. Yet, the number of women in prison in 
general is growing at an alarming rate.125 “The female prison 
population grew by 832% from 1977 to 2007, [while] the male prison 
population grew 416% during the same time period.”126 Nevertheless, 
as the statistics above demonstrate, females remain grossly 
underrepresented on death row and in prisons in comparison to 
males. This, like with race, is not inequity or discrimination, as fire is 
being fought where it burns. 
 
VI. TENNESSEE CAPITAL CASES REACH THE NATION’S CAPITAL 
 
A few death penalty issue cases that merited the attention of 
the Supreme Court of the United States originated in Tennessee. In 
Payne v. Tennessee, the Court reconsidered whether the Eighth 
Amendment barred the admission of victim impact evidence during 
the penalty or sentencing phase of a capital trial.127 Previous Court 
opinions had held “the harm . . . a capital defendant causes a victim’s 
                                                 
123 Lindsay M. Howden & Julie A. Myer, Age and Sex Composition: 2010, 2 
(May, 2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=47. 
124 Id. at 7. 
125 Women’s Prison Ass’n Inst. on Women & Crim. Justice, 
http://www.wpaonline.org/institute/index.htm (last visited March 27, 
2013). 
126 Women’s Prison Ass’n Inst. on Women & Crim. Justice, Quick Facts: 
Women & Criminal Justice-2009, 1 (2009), available at 
http://wpaonline.org/pdf/Quick%20Facts%20Women%20and%20CJ%2020
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127 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811 (1991). 
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family do[es] not in general reflect on the defendant’s 
‘blameworthiness,’ and that only evidence relating to 
‘blameworthiness’ is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.”128 
The Court held, “[w]e are now of the view that a State may properly 
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s 
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the 
sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the 
defendant.”129 The Court rationalized that it wanted to return 
individualism back to victim families, give them a “face,” allow the 
State the full moral force of its evidence, and allow the jury necessary 
information used to determine proper punishment.130 The Court 
opined, “there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in 
mind harm [caused by the defendant to a victim’s family] at the same 
time as it considers mitigating evidence introduced by the 
defendant.”131 The Court further held: 
 
Under the aegis of the Eighth Amendment, we have 
given the broadest latitude to the defendant to 
introduce relevant mitigating evidence reflecting on his 
individual personality, and the defendant’s attorney 
may argue that evidence to the jury . . . . [W]e now 
reject the view [of prior precedent] that a State may not 
permit the prosecutor to similarly argue to the jury the 
human cost of the crime of which the defendant stands 
convicted . . . . “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is 
due to the accuser also . . . .” We thus hold that if the 
State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact 
evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, 
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.132 
 
 Another Tennessee case later reached the Supreme Court of 
the United States and was decided in 2006. Paul Gregory House 
(House) was convicted of a 1985 murder and sentenced to death, but 
new revelations raised doubts about his guilt.133 The Court found 
                                                 
128 Id. at 819. 
129 Id. at 825. 
130 Id. 
131 Payne, 501 U.S. at 826. 
132 Id. at 826-27 (emphasis in original) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
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House presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate actual innocence 
so as to allow “access to a federal court to pursue habeas corpus relief 
based on constitutional claims that are procedurally barred under 
state law.”134 As a result of evidence developed by House’s lawyers 
subsequent to his trial, the Court remanded the case for further 
proceedings with the federal district court ordering Tennessee to retry 
or release him.135 After a stint on bail awaiting retrial, the State, in 
2009, dropped all charges.136 
 A third case of interest of Tennessee origin was decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 2009. The issue raised by Gary Cone 
(Cone) was whether his right to due process was violated when the 
State of Tennessee suppressed evidence supporting his claim of drug 
addiction that included witness statements and police reports which 
potentially corroborated his defense at trial and should have bolstered 
mitigation of the death penalty he then received.137 “Cone asserted an 
insanity defense, contending that he had killed [an elderly couple in 
their home] while suffering from acute amphetamine psychosis, a 
disorder caused by drug addiction.”138  The Court found that Cone 
had not procedurally defaulted his Brady claim, that it had been fully 
considered by the state courts, and that it was ripe for federal 
adjudication.139 While the Court agreed that the withheld documents 
in violation of Brady were not material to Cone’s alleged insane 
mental state, it found the trial court failed to adequately consider 
whether that same evidence was material to mitigation efforts during 
sentencing.140 The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals 
and remanded the case to the District Court to determine in the first 
instance whether there was a reasonable probability that the withheld 
evidence would have altered at least one juror’s assessment of the 
appropriate penalty for Cone’s crimes.141 Currently, Mr. Cone remains 
a resident of Tennessee’s Death Row.142 
 
                                                 
134 Id. at 521-22; See also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 41. 
135 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 41. 
136 Id. at 42. 
137 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963). 
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VII. THE REALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TODAY 
  
 Within Tennessee’s capital punishment history, not unlike the 
rest of the United States, one can observe the influences on death 
penalty jurisprudence through what Chief Justice Warren described 
as the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”143 The ebb and flow of change regarding capital 
punishment in Tennessee was highlighted in previous sections of this 
paper. Reiterated from above, Tennessee did not execute anyone from 
1960 through 2000.144 From 2000 through 2012, Tennessee executed six 
people.145 Eighty-nine people remain under the care of the Tennessee 
Department of Correction on Death Row.146 I agree with what Justice 
Stewart opined over forty years ago that “the [death] penalty is so 
infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to 
be of substantial service to criminal justice.”147 However, “capital 
punishment, under contemporary standards, is not to be viewed as 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime of murder.”148 
Accordingly, I disagree with Justice Stewart’s statement “that [death] 
sentences are ‘unusual’ in the sense that the penalty of death is 
infrequently imposed for murder . . . .”149 
 Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, a wise jurist in his sunset 
eighties, while elaborating on his then-held opinions about capital 
punishment, made statements that closely parallel my own beliefs on 
the subject. Justice Powell voted in favor of the death penalty during 
his term on the Court.150 After his retirement in 1987, Justice Powell 
expressed concern about the problem of excessively repetitious 
litigation in capital cases, and felt that if death sentences could not be 
enforced even where innocence of the defendant and fairness of his or 
her trial was not seriously in doubt, then perhaps legislative bodies 
should reconsider whether it was in the public’s interest to retain a 
                                                 
143 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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punishment enforced so haphazardly.151 He stated, “Capital 
punishment, though constitutional, is not being enforced, [and] . . . it 
reflects discredit on the law to have a major component . . . that is 
simply not enforced.”152 Justice Powell later unequivocally related he 
had come to think capital punishment should be abolished, not 
because it was intrinsically wrong, but because it could not be fairly 
and expeditiously enforced.153 His sense of dignity and his conception 
of the majesty of the law were offended by the endless waiting, 
perpetual litigation, last-minute stays, and midnight executions.154 
Justice Powell felt the spectacle of non-enforcement bred cynicism 
about the law’s announced purposes and contempt for courts that 
could not or would not carry those purposes to fruition.155 He felt it 
better to bar the whole ugly mess rather than continue an indecent, 
embarrassing, and wasteful charade.156 The totality of Justice Powell’s 
views describe the perceived reality about capital punishment now, 
two decades later. 
 Furthermore, our country’s think tank for model law utopia, 
The American Law Institute, recognized the dystopia of “the current 
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensur[e] a 
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment,”157 
and withdrew the death penalty section of the Model Penal Code 
without unequivocally endorsing opposition to such penalties.158 
 
VIII. PLEA BARGAINING 
  
 While Justice Powell’s sentiments, in total, are spot on for the 
current state of capital punishment jurisprudence, I disagree with the 
ideas that the death penalty is of no use at all or that it is completely 
unworkable. The threat of a death sentence is a great plea bargaining 
tool. When a defendant’s life is “saved” by a plea bargained sentence 
                                                 
151 Lewis Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1046 
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of life without the chance of parole or “death by imprisonment,” both 
sides can argue a win. My experience with the death penalty as a 
bargaining tool was influenced in particular by two cases that 
impacted the Tennessee judicial district where I have spent my career 
in law enforcement. 
 The first case involved the carjacking and execution style 
murder of three of the four members of the Lillelid family in Greene 
County in 1997.159 The parents along with their six-year-old daughter 
and two-year-old son were carjacked by a group of six young 
Kentuckians at an Interstate 81 rest area, transported to a nearby rural 
road, and each of the family members were then shot.160 The bodies of 
the children were ritualistically placed in an inverted-cross fashion 
atop the bodies of their parents before the Lillelids were run over with 
their own van.161 The family was left for dead as the murderers fled; 
however, the two-year-old boy survived his injuries. Unfortunately, 
he was blinded in the eye where he had been shot and suffered 
impaired motor skills.162 The Lillelid murders became a salient 
incident that sparked a growing outcry for execution of convicted 
killers.163 Third Judicial District Attorney General, Berkeley Bell 
(General Bell), filed notice that the State would seek the death penalty 
for the four of the six defendants who were adults.164 The defendants 
later agreed to enter guilty pleas after the State agreed not to seek the 
death penalty but life in prison without the chance of parole 
instead.165 A newspaper reporter related General Bell’s rationale: 
 
While many have said justice in the case could be 
obtained only through executing the killers, prosecutor 
                                                 
159 Robert Moore, Court Rejects Lillelid Killer’s Appeal, CITIZEN TRIBUNE, March 
15, 2013, at A1. 
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161 Id. at A1, A6. 
162 10 Years Ago Today…An Unforgettable Tragedy, GREENEVILLE SUN, April 6, 
2007, available at http://www.greenevillesun.com/Local_News/article/10-
Years-Ago-Today--An-Unforgettable-Tragedy-id-276122. 
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Bell said after the six entered guilty pleas . . . that 
Tennessee's death penalty is “in name only.” With 
almost 40 years elapsed since an execution, Bell said a 
death sentence in Tennessee is an effective sentence of 
“life in prison without parole.” Bell said he had 
concerns a jury would be torn at sentencing because an 
alleged shooter—Bryant—would be ineligible for 
execution because of juvenile status, yet the four adults 
would face execution regardless of their shooting a 
victim or not. “Credibility problems” for two key 
prosecution witnesses—one with an existing criminal 
history, the other with a just-discovered felony 
record—also helped swing a decision to offer the six 
removal of the death penalty from sentencing 
consideration in exchange for their complete 
admissions of guilt.166 
 
Scattered appeals continue into 2013 as the defendants protest their 
plea deals.167 
 The second case involved the line-of-duty murder of Hawkins 
County Deputy Gerald Monroe Gibson in 2000.168 Deputy Gibson had 
been part of the team effort to serve an arrest warrant for attempted 
burglary on a suspect who barricaded himself in his home.169 Deputy 
Gibson stepped from cover to attempt to shoot a teargas canister into 
the suspect’s home and was shot in the head by the suspect.170 
General Bell also sought the death penalty in this case.171 A similar 
ensuing plea bargain was struck, the defendant entered a guilty plea, 
and he received a sentence of life without parole.172 General Bell 
stated: 
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All in all with the factors involved in the case, 
particularly for closure for the family [so] they can 
leave all of this behind and not have to relive it again, 
[w]e felt that the second alternative, that is death in the 
penitentiary by natural causes, was the appropriate 
course to take. It is very important for these types of 
cases to be over . . . . [A]fter our discussions with the 
family, we felt that putting it all behind us was very 
important and that is the basic reason that we decided 
to end it this way. [W]e reached an agreement . . . and 
proceeded as expeditiously as possible to close the 
matter out.173 
 
 These two cases evince the typical effectiveness of having the 
death penalty as a tool to sculpt a plea bargain to the mutual benefit 
of each party to the adversarial process. For my part, retention of 
capital punishment is preferred for the worst-of-the-worst to choose 
between the plea bargain or the gamble of a trial. Whether a 
defendant rolls the dice for trial and loses or takes the deal, the 
punishment fits the crime: death by execution or death by 
imprisonment. 
 
IX. WHAT IF IT WERE YOUR FRIEND? 
  
 Most people have not personally known a murder victim or 
the members of the victim’s immediate or impacted family, and it is 
my prayer that such remains a constant in as many lives as possible. 
Hawkins County Deputy Gerald Monroe Gibson was a colleague I 
considered a friend. We were acquainted as agents in the “war on 
drugs” who worked together on a few joint cases and who co-
attended some advanced training. “Bubba,” as Deputy Gibson was 
affectionately known, was a gifted conversationalist who made 
friends easily and who treated adversary criminals with respect. He 
was someone I looked up to as a mentor. I will always remember 
something that Bubba told me. During a war story swapping session, 
he was bemoaning the many hours spent building probable cause for 
a barely successful drug search warrant case. During the search, he 
had located only a few marijuana roaches from an ashtray. Not to be 
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dissuaded for too long, he commented, “At least, by God, they knew 
we were there!”174 
I distinctly remember the gut-wrenching feeling I experienced 
in reaction to Bubba’s murder. I was called out to travel to Hawkins 
County to offer critical incident stress peer support the night of his 
death, and the knot in my stomach was not from motion sickness due 
to traveling the winding rural roads to the top of the fog-covered 
mountain near where he died. The nausea did not leave for days after 
attending his funeral and honors burial. Yet I was many gradients 
away from the immense impact this line-of-duty murder inflicted 
onto his wife, his two daughters, his fellow team member in whose 
arms Bubba died, his other co-workers, his immediate family, friends, 
and community.  
 Aside from basal humanity, the defendant who executed 
Deputy Gibson exhibited no known redeeming qualities. A valuable 
life was sacrificed, and a likely remorseless, unrepentant life carries 
on at the taxpayers’ expense. Such a murderer even gains royalty-like 
“cred” in prison ranks as a cop killer. A 2007 survey showed 68% of 
Tennessee voters endorse the death penalty for murder.175 As a 
distant residual victim of this crime due to the loss of a friend, and 
even from that distance or more, something would be missing if the 
death penalty was always off the table as a potential term in the 





 In conclusion, it is my hope that we carry on utilizing a 
variation of Deputy Gibson’s sage words: with God’s help, let others 
know in a positive way that we are here. As for Tennessee’s death 
penalty, today it remains a vital part of constitutional justice and an 
effective tool that merits reprieve.  
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TABLE 1: RACE OF UNITED STATES MURDER OFFENDERS BASED ON 
CRIME REPORT DATA, 2001-2011 
 
YEAR TOTAL WHITE % BLACK % OTHER % UNKN % 
2011176 14548 4729 32.5 5486 37.7 256 1.8 4077 28 
2010177 15094 4849 32.1 5770 38.2 251 1.7 4224 28 
2009178 15760 5286 33.5 5890 37.4 245 1.6 4339 27.5 
2008179 16277 5334 32.8 5943 36.5 273 1.7 4727 29 
2007180 17040 5278 31 6463 37.9 245 1.4 5054 29.7 
2006181 17399 5339 30.7 6843 39.3 295 1.7 4922 28.3 
                                                 
176 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2011, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
RACE, 2011 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-data-
table-3.  
177 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2010, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, & 
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RACE, 2007 (2008), available at 
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181 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
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RACE, 2006 (2007), available at 
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2005182 17029 5452 32 6379 37.6 299 2 4899 28.8 
2004183 15935 5339 33.5 5608 35.2 271 1.7 4717 29.6 
2003184 16043 5132 32 5729 35.7 308 1.9 4874 30.4 
2002185 15813 5356 33.9 5579 35.3 274 1.7 4604 29.1 
2001186 15488 5174 33.4 5521 35.6 273 1.8 4520 29.2 
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us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2001/table2-6_offendersage01.xls. 
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TABLE 2: RACE OF TENNESSEE MURDER ARRESTEES BASED ON ARREST 
DATA, 2002-2011  
YEAR TOTAL WHITE % BLACK % OTHER % 
2011
187
 295 128 43.4 164 55.6 3 1 
2010
188
 272 114 41.9 154 56.6 4 1.5 
2009
189
 368 141 38.3 222 60.3 5 1.4 
2008
190
 327 119 36.4 201 61.5 7 2.1 
2007
191
 313 110 35.1 202 64.5 1 0.3 
2006
192
 342 113 33 224 65.5 5 1.5 
2005
193
 358 140 39.1 210 58.7 8 2.2 
2004
194
 329 132 40.1 192 58.4 5 1.5 
                                                 
187 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2011, 24, 
(2012), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20Te
nnessee%202011.pdf. 
188 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2010, 26, 
(2011), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/documents/2010CIT.pdf. 
189 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2009, 24, 
(2010), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/documents/CrimeinTN2009.pdf. 
190 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2008, 26, 
(2009), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2008%20Crime%20
in%20Tennessee.pdf. 
191 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2007, 24, 
(2008), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202007.pdf. 
192 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2006, 26, 
(2007), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2006%20All%20Ag
encies%20Combined.pdf. 
193 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2005, 27, 
(2006), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202005%20Complete.pdf. 
194 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2004, 25, 
(2005), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20Te
nnessee%202004.pdf. 




 316 137 43.4 177 56 2 0.6 
2002
196
 353 146 41.4 207 58.6 0 0 
TOTAL 3273 1280 39.1 1953 59.7 40 1.2 
 
  
                                                 
195 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2003, 25, 
(2004), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2003_CIT_Complet
e.pdf. 
196 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2002, 22, 
(2003), available at 
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202002.pdf. 
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TABLE 3: SEX OF UNITED STATES MURDER OFFENDERS BASED ON 
CRIME REPORT DATA, 2001-2011 
 
YEAR TOTAL MALE % FEMALE % UNKN. % 
2011
197
 14548 9458 65.2 1138 7.8 3925 27 
2010
198
 15094 9972 66.1 1075 7.1 4047 26.8 
2009
199
 15760 10391 65.9 1197 7.6 4172 26.5 
2008
200
 16277 10568 64.9 1176 7.2 4533 27.8 
2007
201
 17040 10975 64.4 1206 7.1 4859 28.5 
2006
202
 17399 11508 66.1 1151 6.6 4740 27.2 
2005
203
 17029 11117 65.3 1246 7.3 4666 27.4 
2004
204
 15935 10262 64.4 1130 7.1 4543 28.5 
2003
205
 16043 10218 63.7 1123 7 4702 29.3 
2002
206
 15813 10285 65 1108 7 4420 28 
2001
207
 15488 10126 65.4 1086 7 4276 27.6 
TOTAL 176426 114880 65.1 12636 7.2 48883 27.7 
 
  
                                                 
197 See supra note 176.  
198 See supra note 177. 
199 See supra note 178.  
200 See supra note 179. 
201 See supra note 180. 
202 See supra note 181. 
203 See supra note 182. 
204 See supra note 183. 
205 See supra note 184. 
206 See supra note 185. 
207 See supra note 186. 
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TABLE 4: SEX OF TENNESSEE MURDER ARRESTEES BASED ON ARREST 
DATA, 2002-2011 
YEAR TOTAL MALE % FEMALE % 
2011
208
 295 263 89.2 32 10.8 
2010
209
 272 241 88.6 31 11.4 
2009
210
 368 325 88.3 43 11.7 
2008
211
 327 299 91.4 28 8.6 
2007
212
 313 282 90.1 31 9.9 
2006
213
 342 302 88.3 40 11.7 
2005
214
 358 314 87.7 44 12.3 
2004
215
 329 290 88.1 39 11.9 
2003
216
 316 276 87.3 40 12.7 
2002
217
 353 317 89.8 36 10.2 
TOTAL 3273 2909 88.9 364 11.1 
 
 
                                                 
208 See supra note 187. 
209 See supra note 188. 
210 See supra note 189. 
211 See supra note 190. 
212 See supra note 191. 
213 See supra note 192. 
214 See supra note 193. 
215 See supra note 194. 
216 See supra note 195. 
217 See supra note 196. 
